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I. INTRODUCTION
After the United States Navy diverted to Italian territory a civil
airliner carrying the Achille Lauro hijackers,' the United States imme-
diately sought extradition from the Italian government.2 The Italian
government clearly had jurisdiction under international law to try the
hijackers, because the crimes had been committed on board a vessel of
Italian registry.3 The United States also may have had jurisdiction to
try them under the International Convention against the Taking of
Hostages.' At least that Convention could have provided the basis for
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A., 1970, Stanford University; J.D.,
1974, University of Michigan.
1. N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at A9, col. 1. See generally Note, Towards a New
Definition of Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident, 26 VA. J. INT'L. L. 723, 745-47 (1986).
2. N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at A6, col. 6. See 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1509-57
(1985).
3. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7); Convention on the
High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 6, 13 U.S.T. 2313, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
4.-Dec. 17, 1979, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, - U.N.T.S. -, reprinted in 18 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1457 (1979) (entered into force on June 3, 1983, entered into force for the
United States on January 6, 1985). Article 5 of the convention requires each state party to
establish criminal jurisdiction over each offense of hostage taking, as defined in the convention,
committed "in order to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act; or ... with
respect to a hostage who is a national of that State, if that State considers it appropriate." -
U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, - U.N.T.S. -, reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at
1458. In compliance with the convention, a federal statute, the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2186 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1203), makes hostage
taking a federal crime when either of the above conditions is met with respect to the United
States.
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rebutting any argument that the United States had an insufficient con-
nection with the crime to warrant the trial of a foreign citizen for a
crime committed outside United States territory.'
If a terrorist were extradited to the United States pursuant to a
treaty, however, he could only be tried for the crime or crimes upon
which the extradition was based.6 In other words, the international
law principle of "specialty" is applied by the United States courts.7
5. Under customary international law, states may exercise criminal jurisdiction when the
crime occurred within the state's territory (territoriality principle); when the criminal is a
national of the state exercising jurisdiction (nationality principle); when the crime was against
the governmental functions of the state exercising jurisdiction, e.g., counterfeiting money
(protective principle); or when the crime is one against mankind in general, e.g., piracy or war
crimes (universality principle). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§§ 10-36 (1965); Empson, The Application of Criminal Law to Acts Committed Outside the
Jurisdiction, 6 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 32 (1967); Feller, Jurisdiction over Offenses with a Foreign
Element, in 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5, at 17-34 (M. Bassiouni &
V. Nanda eds. 1973); Harvard Research in International Law, Introductory Comment,
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 443, 445 (Supp. 1935); Sarkar, The
Proper Law of Crime in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 50 (G.
Mueller & E. Wise eds. 1965); Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Jurisdiction Following
Forcible Abduction: A New Israeli Precedent in International Law, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1087,
1089-1103 (1974).
These limits are imposed by American criminal courts under the canon of construction
that statutes, including criminal statutes, should be interpreted, if possible, to be consistent
with the international legal obligations of the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Marino-
Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1380 (1 1th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1114 (1983); United States
v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d
8, 9-10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 549
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961); cf Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 581-82
(6th Cir. 1985) (international law limits on foreign state's criminal jurisdiction used to
interpret federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 3184) providing for international extradition).
It should be noted that the United States has consistently rejected the idea that the
victim's nationality is sufficient to give the victim's state jurisdiction. See United States v.
Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 1979); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1179 n.38 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Letter from Mr. Bayard,
Secretary of State, to Mr. Connery, Charg6 to Mexico, 1887 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 751; 2 J.
MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 232-40 (1906); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 30(2); Harvard Research in International Law, supra, at 445.
But see Chapter 113A of Title XII of the recent Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism Act, providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain crimes against
United States nationals. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1986). The crimes are homicide, attempt or
conspiracy to commit homicide, and intentional physical violence or physical violence that
results in bodily injury. Prosecution is permitted, however, only if the Attorney General, the
Deputy Attorney General, or the Associate Attorney General certifies that the "offense was
intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a civilian population." 18
U.S.C. § 2331(e); see also H.R. REP. No. 494, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1865, 1960. For a more extensive discussion of this Act, see
Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Acts of Terrorism Committed Abroad: Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 599 (1987).
6. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d
894, 905 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973).
7. See generally I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 146-47 (1971).
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But if a terrorist were brought to the United States directly, without
resort to any extradition treaty, there would be no comparable limit
upon the jurisdiction of the United States to try him-that is, no limit
based upon the manner of apprehending and producing the defend-
ant. This proposition would be true regardless of whether the appre-
hension was wrongful under international law.8
Thus, if the Navy had somehow diverted the terrorists' airliner
all the way to the United States, the United States courts trying them
would not have to examine the international legality of the Navy
actions. While strong arguments could be made that the actions of
the Navy in the Achille Lauro affair were consistent with international
law,9 contrary arguments could also be made,1" and it would be easier
for a United States court simply to rely upon the principle that appre-
hension contrary to international law does not preclude trial of the
person so apprehended. A court applying this principle may assume
for the sake of argument that the apprehension was contrary to inter-
national law.
Given this assumption, what sense does it make to say that
courts cannot allow violation of the extradition principle of "spe-
cialty," but that they can permit the trial of persons whose very pres-
ence before the court is a result of a violation of customary
international law? Is treaty law somehow superior to customary
international law?1' If not, is it consistent for our courts to enforce
8. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
9. See Note, An Analysis of the Achille Lauro Affair: Towards an Effective and Legal
Method of Bringing International Terrorists to Justice, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 328, 357-62
(1986); see also Recent Developments, Use of Force: Interception of Aircraft, 27 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 761 (1986); McCredie, Contemporary Uses of Force Against Terrorism: The United States
Response to Achille Lauro-Questions of Jurisdiction and its Exercise, 16 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 435 (1986); McGinley, The Achille Lauro Affair-Implications for International
Law, 52 TENN. L. REV. 691 (1985).
10. See Note, supra note 9, at 363-65.
11. Professor Trimble argues as much. See Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary
International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986). Of course, article VI of the Constitution
makes self-executing treaties the law of the land in a way that does not apply to customary
international law. But for a number of purposes, international law is used by domestic courts,
and would be used, even without article VI. Courts, for instance, use international law as a
canon of statutory construction. See supra note 5. Second, they use international law as a
source of federal law when no other is available. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S.
361 (1934). Third, they use international law when it is incorporated by reference in a statute.
See, e.g., United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965). For these purposes, it makes little
sense to distinguish customary international law from treaty law. Both are equally binding on
the international plane, and the considerations that make treaty law relevant apply as well to
customary law.
Arguments based on the greater democratic controls on treatymaking neglect the fact that
it is the executive-a politically responsible branch-which takes most of the actions on the
part of the United States that establish customary international law. It is not necessary to
1987]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the obligation not to deceive another country by saying that we will
try an extradited person for only one crime, while refusing to enforce
the obligation not to kidnap suspects from the territory of a sovereign
foreign state?
II. WHEN INTERNATIONAL LAW PRECLUDES TRIAL BECAUSE OF
THE MANNER OF APPREHENSION
The answer to these questions lies not in the difference between
treaty law and customary international law, but rather in the nature
and extent of the particular international obligations imposed upon
states by treaty and custom. In other words, it is not simply because a
treaty is involved that the principle of specialty applies, but rather
because the extradition treaties involved are interpreted to impose the
principle of specialty as an obligation. A valid extradition treaty
could conceivably be interpreted not to require application of the
principle of specialty, and in that case a United States court presuma-
bly would not need to limit the scope of the prosecution to any spe-
cific crimes. On the other hand, the principle of specialty, because it
is based upon treaty interpretation, simply does not come into play
when there has been no treaty-based extradition.
The international law limit upon the ability of a state to try an
extradited person, and the contrasting absence of a limit on the ability
to try a person who has been apprehended in contravention of another
nation's sovereignty, are reflected in a pair of cases decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States in 1886. The Court's decisions in
United States v. Rauscher I2 and Ker v. Illinois,'3 decided on the same
day, with both majority opinions written by Justice Miller, suggest
that the Supreme Court viewed the holdings of the two cases as being
perfectly consistent.
Rauscher, a ship's officer, had been extradited from Great Britain
to the United States pursuant to the extradition treaty then in force
between the two countries, upon the charge of having murdered a
member of the crew.' 4 He was tried, however, upon the lesser charge
of inflicting cruel and unusual punishment upon the victim.' 5 The
Court held that the treaty precluded the trial of Rauscher for an
denigrate the efficacy or relevance of customary international law to assert that domestic
courts are not empowered to insure the executive's compliance with customary international
law. See Rogers, Domestic Legal Challenges to US. Policy in Nicaragua, 6 ST. Louis U. PuB.
L. REV. 77 (1987).
12. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
13. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
14. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 409-10.
15. Id. at 409.
[Vol. 42:447
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offense different from that for which he had been demanded from
Great Britain, and held that the lower federal courts therefore lacked
jurisdiction to try him on the charge of inflicting cruel and unusual
punishment. 16
In contrast, Ker, the defendant in the second case, was a fugitive
brought to the United States without having been formally extra-
dited.' 7 Ker was kidnapped in Peru, brought to the United States
against his will, and tried in/Illinois for larceny committed in that
state.' 8 The American who took Ker into custody had the proper
extradition papers with him when he arrived in Lima, but did not
present them to any officer of the Peruvian government, or make any
demand on that government for Ker's surrender.' 9 He forcibly
brought Ker to San Francisco, whereupon Ker was extradited to Illi-
nois.2" The Court held that neither constitutional due process, 2' nor
the treaty between Peru and the United States,22 warranted a reversal
of Ker's conviction. The Court found that another issue presented to
it-whether customary international law would preclude trial in a
state court following a forcible abduction-was not a federal question,
and that it was thus beyond the Court's appellate jurisdiction.23
16. Id. at 409-10, 433.
17. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438.
18. Id. at 437-38.
19. Id. at 438. A fact of the case that was available to the Court, but was not mentioned in
its opinion, was that the Peruvian government had at the time only a nominal existence in the
mountains 85 miles from Lima. Lima was occupied by Chilean forces, and the military
governor of Lima had dispatched an officer to assist the American messenger in putting Ker on
his way back to the United States. Fairman, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 678,
685 (1953).
20. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438-39.
21. Id. at 439-40.
22. Id. at 441-43.
23. Id. at 444. More recent lower court opinions, to the effect that customary inter-
national law is ipso facto federal common law, appear to have ignored Ker's precise holding.
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 779 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885-89
(2d Cir. 1980). Commentators assuming that customary international law is federal common
law have also failed to reconcile the Ker holding. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 223 (1972); Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of
Customary International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 321, 343-
48 (1985); Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248, 291-97. Of course,
customary international law may be used as the rule of decision when a court has jurisdiction
over a dispute and has no other legal basis upon which to decide the case. See, e.g., New Jersey
v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383-84 (1934); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). But
this conclusion does not imply that customary international law supersedes state law because it
is "federal law," any more than customary international law supersedes other sources of
federal law. See Goldklang, Back on Board the Paquete Habana: Resolving the Conflict
Between Statutes and Customary International Law, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 143 (1984). But cf
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491-97 (1983) (customary
1987]
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The Court's refusal to treat customary international law as fed-
eral law in this context suggests that the Court based its decision on
the difference in the domestic effect between treaties and customary
international law. In dictum, however, the Supreme Court indicated
that even if it were to apply customary international law, prosecution
would be appropriate despite Ker's apprehension in violation of the
sovereign rights of a foreign state:
There are authorities of the highest respectability which hold that
such forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should
not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the court which
has the right to try him for such an offense, and presents no valid
objection to his trial in such court.2 4
The Ker decision has come to serve as the leading precedent for this
principle both as a matter of international law,25 and as a matter of
United States law.26
international law codified by statute is federal law for the purposes of the "arising under"
clause of article III); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-22, 425 (1964)
(act of state doctrine-which is not a principle of customary international law-is a matter of
federal common law).
24. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444.
25. For example, in response to a request from Mexico for the return of one Martinez, who
had been improperly brought into the United States in order to stand trial for an offense
against the laws of California, the United States relied on Ker to maintain that "the
irregularity in the manner of bringing the defendant within the jurisdiction was not a defense
which could be pleaded as a valid bar to trial for a crime upon a regular indictment .... "
Letter from the Acting Secretary of State to the Mexican Charg6, [1906] 2 FOREIGN REL. U.S.
1121-22. In addition, 4 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 311, 331 (1906), relies
upon Ker for the same principle, and the United States has relied on Ker at the international
level to refuse requests to return kidnapped fugitives. 2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 152, 321 (1941); see also 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1080-81 (1968); Afouneh v. Attorney-General, [1941-42] Ann. Dig.
327 (No. 97) (Sup. Ct. of Palestine sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeal, 1942) (relying upon
J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW); Attorney-General v. Eichmann, 36 INT'L L.
REP. 18, 59-71 (Dist. Ct., Israel 1961), aff'd., 36 INT'L L. REP. 277 (Sup. Ct. of Israel sitting
as a Court of Criminal Appeal 1962) (relying upon Ker).
26. See United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1530-31 (1 1th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 36-37 (lst Cir. 1981); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1259-60
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Lopez, 542 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Waits v.
McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043, 1045
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d
62, 64-65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975,
985-86, 988-89 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Parks v. United States, 423 U.S. 825 (1975);
United States v. Cotton, 471 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973); Autry
v. Wiley, 440 F.2d 799, 801-02 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 404 U.S. 886 (1971); People v. Garner,
57 Cal. 2d 135, 141, 367 P.2d 680, 683, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40, 43 (1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 929
(1962); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975).
The Ker principle has also been applied to interstate delivery of fugitives. Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Hines v. Guthrie, 342 F. Supp. 594, 595-96 (W.D. Va. 1972);
Hein v. Ramsden, 36 Misc. 2d 345, 232 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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The Supreme Court held in Rauscher, however, that the defend-
ant could not be tried for a crime that was not the basis for his extra-
dition.27 This decision was based not simply on the fact that a treaty
governed extradition matters between the United States and Great
Britain, but on a finding that the treaty, properly interpreted, directly
prohibited such a trial.
After explaining at some length that extradition is a federal and
not a state matter,28 the Court devoted the bulk of its opinion to dem-
onstrating that the treaty amounted to an undertaking by the United
States and Great Britain not to try extradited persons for crimes other
than those that served as the basis for the extradition.29 In so doing,
the Court relied upon diplomatic exchanges between the United
States and Great Britain concerning the proper interpretation of the
treaty,3° the works of English and American publicists, 31 canons of
construction for treaties,32 federal statutes dealing with extradition
treaties,33 and state court interpretations of similar treaties.34
Throughout its analysis the Court was clearly concerned with the
question of whether the United States had undertaken as a matter of
treaty law not to try a person for a crime that was not the basis for
extradition. The Court answered the question affirmatively, noting
that it would be "unreasonable that the country of the asylum should
be expected to deliver up such person to be dealt with by the demand-
ing government without any limitation, implied or otherwise, upon its
prosecution of the party."
35
This reasoning suggests that in the case of an extradition treaty
there is a quid pro quo. A nation agrees to give up certain persons for
trial, but expects in return that the person will be tried only for the
offense upon which the extradition is based. In the absence of such a
treaty, there is left only the general international legal obligation not
to infringe upon the territorial sovereignty of the foreign state, but no
corollary obligation not to try a person obtained in violation of that
sovereignty. Thus, the Ker Court distinguished the Rauscher case on
the ground that Ker did not come "to this country clothed with the
protection which the nature of [extradition] proceedings and the true
27. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 409-10.
28. Id. at 412-15.
29. Id. at 415-30.
30. Id. at 415-16.
31. Id. at 416-17.
32. Id. at 420-21.
33. Id. at 423-24.
34. Id. at 424-29.
35. Id. at 419.
1987]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:447
construction of the treaty gave [Rauscher]." 6
Stated simply, the United States has an international obligation
to foreign states not to invade their territory to obtain fugitives. If
we do, we may pay reparation, 7 apologize,38 or even extradite the
kidnappers themselves.39 But there is no obligation not to try the kid-
napped person. Indeed, the foreign state may have little interest in
protecting the kidnapped fugitive, inasmuch as he may not be a
national of that state." If, however, in order to have a foreign state
deliver up a fugitive, which the foreign state is not otherwise obligated
to do, the United States promises by treaty not to try him for crimes
other than those serving as the basis for his extradition, then to try
him for such an additional crime obviously violates that international
obligation, and is not permitted domestically by virtue of the constitu-
tional supremacy of treaties.4'
The above distinction is not one between customary international
law and treaty law, but between the scope of obligations that each
happens to contain. Thus, if nations come to feel obliged to refrain
36. Ker, 119 U.S. at 443.
37. When Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann was kidnapped in Argentina, allegedly by
agents of the Israeli government, and forcibly brought to Israel, Argentina lodged a complaint
with the Security Council of the United Nations. In response, the Security Council passed a
resolution requesting "the Government of Israel to make appropriate reparation in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law." S.C. Res. 138, 15
U.N. SCOR (868th mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960).
38. In lieu of an apology, a nation may accept an acknowledgement that its sovereign
rights were violated. In response to the resolution referred to in the preceding footnote, the
governments of Israel and Argentina issued a joint communiqu6 on August 3, 1960, resolving
"to regard as closed the incident which arose out of the action taken by citizens of Israel,
which infringed the fundamental rights of the State of Argentina." Attorney-General v.
Eichmann, 36 INT'L L. REP. at 59.
39. In refusing the request of Mexico to return a person improperly brought to the United
States to stand trial, the United States government relied, in part, on the fact that the man's
kidnapper had been surrendered to the government of Mexico. Letter from the Acting
Secretary of State to the Mexican Charg6, [1906] 2 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 1121-22. More
recently, the United States has extradited to Canada two "bounty hunters" who, acting as
agents of a company that had posted a bond for a Florida criminal defendant, had allegedly
kidnapped the defendant in Toronto, Canada, and brought him back to Florida. Kear v.
Hilton, 699 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1983).
40. Customary international law limitations on a state's criminal jurisdiction over the
person are maintained internationally by the state of nationality of the person. See, e.g., S.S.
Lotus (Fr. v. Turk), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). Indeed, it is generally only the
state of nationality that may bring an international claim in respect of an injury to a particular
person. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6); Reparations for Injuries
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 11).
41. U.S. CONST. art. VI. Of course, a treaty must be self-executing to apply domestically
without implementing legislation. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 313-14 (1829);
infra text accompanying notes 89-98. The Rauscher Court easily found the extradition treaty
to be self-executing in this regard. 119 U.S. at 419.
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from trying kidnapped fugitives,42 then customary international law
could change, and at least as a matter of international law, the result
of Ker would have to be different.43 Similarly, an extradition treaty
might be construed to provide for extradition of certain persons, with-
out any obligation on the requesting state to limit the bases for crimi-
nal trial once the fugitive has been extradited. 4" Indeed, the issue
presented to the Rauscher Court was recognized to be simply whether
the treaty in that case should be so construed.45
The possibility that a particular treaty dealing with territorial
sovereignty might not limit the right of a state to try a person
obtained in violation of that sovereignty apparently escaped the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States
v. Postal.46 As a result, the court engaged in a strained and questiona-
ble,4" but unfortunately influential,4" analysis to conclude that the
treaty involved in the case was not self-executing.
42. Such a development is not inconceivable. Canada recently protested to the United
States over the alleged kidnapping from Canada to the United States of Florida criminal
defendant Sidney Jaffe on September 24, 1981, by "bounty hunters" acting as agents of the
company that had posted bond for Mr. Jaffe. See Kear v. Hilton, 699 F.2d 181, 182-83 (4th
Cir. 1983); Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F. Supp. 1371, 1374 (W.D.N.Y. 1985). In addition to obtaining
extradition of the bounty hunters to Canada, the United States Secretary of State filed a
statement with the Probation and Parole Commission of the State of Florida urging that Mr.
Jaffe be granted parole in order to avoid "a generally deleterious effect on our relations with
Canada." Statement of George P. Schultz, Secretary of State, to the Probation and Parole
Commission, State of Florida (July 22, 1983) (In re: Sidney Leonard Jaffe, Inmate No.
082007).
43. Indeed, in Autry v. Wiley, 440 F.2d 799 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 886 (1971),
the court of appeals suggested that Rauscher might apply even in the absence of an extradition
treaty, "where the country of asylum delivers up a fleeing criminal, expressly or impliedly
attaching certain conditions to the return." Id. at 801.
44. Courts have held, under article IV, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution, that
extradition within the United States from one state to another does not limit the basis for
criminal prosecution. See Siegal v. Edwards, 566 F.2d 958, 960 (5th Cir. 1978).
45. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 415-16.
46. 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979).
47. For criticism of the Postal court's non-self-executing analysis, see Riesenfeld, The
Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal: Win at Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L.
892 (1980); Note, United States v. Postal: Lost on the High Seas, 31 MERCER L. REV. 1081
(1980); Note, Treaties-Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas Is Not Self-Executing, 55
NOTRE DAME LAW. 293 (1979).
48. Federal courts often refer to Postal when discussing whether a treaty is self-executing.
See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 938 (11th Cir. 1985); Frolova v. USSR, 761
F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); United States v. Green, 671
F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Liles, 670 F.2d 989, 992 n.8 (11 th Cir.), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982); British Caledonian Airways v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153, 1160 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); EDS Corp. Iran v. Social Security Org. of Iran, 651 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir.
1981); Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1406 (D.D.C. 1985); Vigile v.
Sava, 535 F. Supp. 1002, 1018 n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Alien Children Education
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The defendants in Postal were tried for conspiracy to import
marijuana, following their arrest by the United States Coast Guard on
a British flag vessel49 on the high seas." The Fifth Circuit concluded
that the boarding of the vessel violated international law5 under arti-
cle 6 of the Convention on the High Seas, which provides that a ship
on the high seas is "subject to [the] exclusive jurisdiction" of the flag
state.5 2 Because the international law violation was a treaty violation,
the court reasoned that Ker would only apply if the treaty was not
self-executing, and thus had no independent domestic force. 3 But
Ker could have been applied regardless of whether the treaty was self-
executing by interpreting the substance of the treaty as not precluding
the trial of defendants arrested in violation of the exclusive jurisdic-
tion established by the treaty.
The Fifth Circuit apparently felt unable to apply Ker in this way
because of two Supreme Court cases that distinguished Ker.54 Both
Ford v. United States55 and Cook v. United States56 involved the same
bilateral treaty between the United States and Great Britain. This
treaty permitted the United States to board and seize British flag ves-
sels to enforce liquor prohibition laws, but only within the distance
from the coast of the United States that a vessel could traverse in one
Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 589-90 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Centre for Independence of Judges v.
Mabey, 19 Bankr. 635, 647 n.15 (D. Utah 1982).
The en bane Fifth Circuit in United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1082 (5th Cir.
1980), described the self-execution analysis in Postal with approval, although four judges in
their concurring opinion stated that they "differ with the majority . . . discussion of self-
executing treaties." Id. at 1094 n.2 (Rubin, J., concurring).
49. The vessel was of Grand Cayman registry. Postal, 589 F.2d at 868 n.8. The Grand
Cayman Islands are a British territory. The court determined that under United Kingdom
practice treaties entered into by the United Kingdom apply to all its territories unless there is a
provision to the contrary. There was no such contrary provision in the British ratification
instrument for the High Seas Convention. Id.
50. The boarding took place approximately sixteen and three-tenths miles from the nearest
United States coastline. Postal, 589 F.2d at 867. The court determined that this location was
on the high seas, and not within the twelve-mile contiguous zone for the prevention and
punishment of certain types of offenses. Id. at 868-70; see Convention on the High Seas,
opened for signature April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82,
(entered into force Sept. 30, 1962), arts. 1-6; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, opened for signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 499
U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force Sept. 10, 1964), arts. 1, 24.
51. The court found that the boarding did not meet the requirements for "hot pursuit"
authorized by article 23 of the Convention on the High Seas. Postal, 589 F.2d at 872-73.
52. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 50, 13 U.S.T. at 2315, T.I.A.S. No. 5200 at
2315, 450 U.N.T.S. at 86.
53. Postal, 589 F.2d at 873-76.
54. Id. at 874-76.
55. 273 U.S. 593 (1927).




In Ford the defendants had been tried for conspiracy to violate
the prohibition laws by importing liquor.5 8 Their British flag vessel
had been seized five and seven-tenths miles from United States terri-
tory.59 Among the questions resolved by the Court were the follow-
ing: First, whether the seizure of the vessel was in accordance with
the treaty;6" and second, if it was, whether the treaty prohibited prose-
cution of the British subjects on board the seized vessel, in view of the
fact that although the treaty permitted boarding and seizure, it did
not expressly permit prosecution.6'
On the first question, the courts below had found that the vessel
had been seized within the distance specified by the treaty. 62 The
defendants argued that the validity of the seizure should have been
submitted to the jury. 63 The government responded that even if the
seizures were illegal, under Ker that fact would not deprive the court
of jurisdiction to try the defendants. 64 The Supreme Court refused to
apply Ker, however, because Ker's precise holding-that the validity
of a trial after seizure in violation of customary international law
"was not a matter of federal cognizance"-did not apply where a
treaty was involved. 65 As we have seen, however, Ker has come to
stand for what was only suggested in the actual Ker opinion: that
trial after seizure in violation of customary international law is per-
mitted under international law, and accordingly under domestic
law.66 The Ford Court did not reject the application of the Ker prin-
ciple to cases in which the arrest had been in violation of treaty law.
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit appears to have read the Ford Court's
treatment of Ker in that way. 67 In fact, the Ford Court rejected the
defendants' contention that the validity of the seizure should have
57. Convention for the Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, Jan. 23, 1924,
United States-Great Britain, art. II, 43 Stat. 1761, T.S. No. 685.
58. Ford, 273 U.S. at 601.
59. Id. at 603.
60. Id. at 600.
61. Id. The Supreme Court also determined that the treaty authorized prosecution not
only for the substantive offense of illegal importation or attempt to import, but also for
conspiracy to effect it. Id. at 600, 616-19. Finally, the Court determined that persons outside
the United States, conspiring and cooperating to violate its laws with other persons within the
United States and to commit overt acts therein, could be prosecuted when subsequently
apprehended in the United States. Id. at 600-01, 619-24.
62. Id. at 604-05.
63. Id. at 605.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 605-06.
66. See supra note 25.
67. Postal, 589 F.2d at 874-75.
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been submitted to the jury on the entirely different ground that the
issue had been improperly raised below.6" Thus, the Court's dictum
regarding Ker in no way precludes application of a Ker-like principle
when an arrest violates treaty law.
More important is the Ford Court's resolution of the second
question. The defendants had argued that the treaty, by permitting
boarding and seizure of the vessel, precluded prosecution of persons
on board,69 on the theory of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.7 °
The Court rejected this argument, in part by referring to the treaty
provision that "the vessel may be seized and taken into a port of the
United States ... for adjudication in accordance with such laws," and
inferring therefrom the intent "that both ship and those on board are
to be subjected to prosecution on incriminating evidence."7 1 In other
words, the Court read the treaty not only as permitting boarding and
arrest, but also as an implicit grant of jurisdiction to prosecute offend-
ers. In this sense, therefore, the treaty operated like an extradition
treaty; the United States was permitted to try someone taken from the
quasi-territorial jurisdiction of Great Britain.
It is more instructive to examine the Ford Court's distinction of
United States v. Rauscher in this connection,72 rather than its distinc-
tion of Ker. The Rauscher Court had interpreted the Anglo-Ameri-
can extradition treaty in the case as precluding trial for a crime that
had not served as a basis for the extradition.73 The Ford Court distin-
guished Rauscher solely on the ground that the liquor treaty did per-
mit trial of liquor smugglers arrested on vessels seized under the
treaty.74 The Court even suggested that the defendants could not
have been tried for other crimes: "If it were attempted to try the
defendants or to forfeit the cargo that was brought into port, for
smuggling of forbidden opium, a different question might possibly be
presented."7 5 Thus, the treaty involved in Ford was like the extradi-
tion treaty in Rauscher, in that it permitted prosecution of defendants
apprehended for certain crimes and precluded prosecution for other
crimes. The only reason that Rauscher did not apply was because the
defendants in Ford were being tried for crimes covered by the treaty.
The idea that the liquor treaty precluded trial when the arrest
68. Ford, 273 U.S. at 606.
69. Id. at 607.
70. Id. at 611.
71. Id. at 610.
72. Id. at 614-16.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 27-35.




was illegal is further reflected in the Supreme Court's holding in Cook
v. United States.76 A British vessel, the Mazel Toy, had been boarded
and seized by the Coast Guard more than one-hour's sailing distance
from the United States coast, with a cargo of intoxicating liquor
intended for the United States." The federal government instituted
libel proceedings against the vessel and its cargo to enforce penalties
for the failure to include the liquor in the manifest of a vessel bound
for the United States, a violation of the Tariff Act.78 The Supreme
Court held that the libels were properly dismissed.79
The government had argued that it was immaterial that posses-
sion of the vessel and its cargo had been acquired by a wrongful act
where the United States had filed a libel bill to enforce a forfeiture
resulting from a violation of its law.8 0 The Court rejected this argu-
ment, noting that the doctrine rested on a common law rule by which
the government, by its forfeiture proceeding, could ratify and there-
fore legitimate a seizure of property made by one without authority."1
The common law rule was held not to apply when the lack of author-
ity resulted from the violation of treaty limitations.8 2 By permitting
seizure in certain conditions, the Treaty precluded seizure, and subse-
quent adjudication of such seizure, under other conditions:
The Treaty fixes the conditions under which a "vessel may be
seized and taken into a port of the United States, its territories or
possessions for adjudication in accordance with" the applicable
laws. Thereby, Great Britain agreed that adjudication may follow
a rightful seizure. Our Government, lacking power to seize, lacked
power, because of the Treaty, to subject the vessel to our laws. To
hold that adjudication may follow a wrongful seizure would go far
to nullify the purpose and effect of the Treaty. Compare United
States v. Rauscher ....
This passage-especially the reference to Rauscher--certainly permits
the conclusion that the liquor treaty affirmatively prohibited adjudica-
76. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
77. Id. at 107-08.
78. Id. at 108.
79. Id. at 120. The main issue in the case was whether a federal statutory provision per-
mitting Coast Guard seizures within twelve nautical miles of the coast had been superseded by
the liquor treaty, inasmuch as the Mazel Toy had been boarded eleven and five-tenths miles
from the coast. The Court held that the treaty was intended to limit boardings to the area
covered by one hour's sailing time, even if within twelve miles. Id. at 111-18. Further, the
Court found that the treaty was self-executing, and that the treaty thus superseded the earlier
federal statute. Id. at 118-20.
80. Id. at 121.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 121-22 (citation omitted).
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tions of seizures not allowed by the treaty, and that the Supreme
Court was relying upon that fact.
Thus neither Ford nor Cook actually held that an arrest follow-
ing a seizure in violation of treaty law would invalidate a subsequent
criminal prosecution. To the extent that dictum in Ford, or a parallel
analysis in Cook, would imply that conclusion, such a conclusion
would necessarily be based on an affirmative limitation on criminal
prosecution found in the 1924 liquor treaty. Whether this is a fair
interpretation of the treaty may be argued; the important point is that
in any event the Supreme Court appeared to interpret the treaty that
way.
Nothing requires the inference of a comparable affirmative limi-
tation in every treaty delineating territorial or comparable jurisdic-
tion. A treaty establishing a new boundary between two countries, for
instance, would not necessarily preclude the trial of a person kid-
napped across the new border, even though the kidnapping itself
might have violated the border treaty. If a state has the right, recog-
nized by customary international law at least since Ker, to try a crimi-
nal defendant despite an arrest in violation of another state's legally
protected sovereignty, it ought to be able to modify the boundaries of
its territory without giving up that right.
Similarly, a state should be able to modify by treaty the condi-
tions under which it can exercise territorial or quasi-territorial juris-
diction, without giving up the right recognized in Ker. Of course, a
state may wish to give up this right, and the Supreme Court has held
that such a relinquishment is generally to be inferred in extradition
treaties. The first step, however, for a United States court with a
defendant obtained in violation of an international treaty is to deter-
mine whether the treaty not only disallows the arrest, but also forbids
a subsequent trial. Apart from extradition treaties, there is no reason
to presume that a treaty will have such an intent.
The Fifth Circuit skipped this step in Postal, and apparently
assumed that the boarding of the vessel in violation of article 6 of the
Convention on the High Seas meant that prosecution of the defend-
ants would also violate the treaty.84 Nothing in the language of article
6, however, supports such an interpretation. Article 6 provides:
"Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in excep-
tional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in these
articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high
84. 589 F.2d at 878.
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seas. '"85 This provision reflects the international legal principle that
ships are, in most jurisdictional respects, like the land territory of the
flag state.86 This provision is thus analogous to a border treaty. It
does not refer to the turning over of fugitives or criminals at all, and it
would be difficult to infer such a reference without attributing more to
the words "exclusive jurisdiction" than the jurisdiction that a state
has with respect to its own territory. Indeed, some of the Postal
court's analysis purporting to show that article 6 is not self-executing
is more persuasive as a demonstration that article 6 did not have the
effect of overturning the international law principle of Ker.87
The danger of the Postal court's failure to distinguish Ford and
Cook lies not just in a possible misinterpretation of article 6 of the
Convention of the High Seas, but in the possibility that terrorists
apprehended in violation of the territorial sovereignty of other states
may escape criminal prosecution. The United States is, of course, vig-
orously opposed to terrorist actions around the world. It is not hard
to envisage further actions to bring terrorists to justice in the United
States. And, although a United States court should not try a for-
eigner with whom there is no sufficient nexus to the United States
under international law,88 it is not in the public interest to permit
terrorist defendants to make broad-based international law challenges
to the manner in which they were apprehended. Of course the extra-
dition law principle of specialty should be enforced, as in Rauscher,8 9
but a challenge based on a friendship treaty, a border treaty, or a
jurisdiction-allocating treaty, such as a law of the seas treaty, should
not be considered by a United States court unless the treaty is shown
not just to deal with the legality of the method in which the defendant
was obtained, but also to limit subsequent criminal prosecution.
85. Convention on the High Seas, art. 6, 13 U.S.T. at 2315, T.I.A.S. No. 5200 at 2315, 450
U.N.T.S. at 86.
86. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25 (Sept. 7); United States v.
Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155 (1933); Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U.S. 572, 574 (1880);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 26-28 (1965).
87. For instance, the Postal court distinguished the findings in Ford and Cook that the
liquor treaty was self-executing on the ground that "it was assumed that Great Britain would
assert the rights of its vessels and their crews under international law not to be subjected to
[United States] adjudication." Postal, 589 F.2d at 883. The same observation better supports
the conclusion that the liquor treaty simply precluded adjudication, unlike the High Seas
Convention.
88. E.g., United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1979).
89. In Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 583-84 (6th Cir. 1985), the court questioned
whether a fugitive has standing to assert the principle of specialty. Without referring to
Rauscher, the court stated that the "right to insist on application of the principle of specialty
belongs to the requested state, not to the individual whose extradition is requested," and cited
Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (D.D.C. 1979).
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If Ford and Cook were applied to every alleged treaty violation,
trials of terrorists could too readily be turned into trials of the govern-
ment action in obtaining the terrorists. This would not only hinder
effective prosecution, but it would also be inconsistent with the consti-
tutional allocation to the executive branch of primary authority to
determine how the United States will comply with international law.
This primary responsibility is reflected in the principle that the courts
defer to the President in the interpretation of treaties,9" in the act of
state doctrine,91 and in the political question 92 and other justiciability
doctrines.93
III. WHEN INTERNATIONAL LAW LIMITS ON TRIAL ARE
APPLICABLE IN UNITED STATES COURTS
A second untoward effect of the Postal court's failure to interpret
article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas as not limiting criminal
prosecutions was that in order to uphold the conviction the court was
compelled to hold that article 6 was not self-executing as a matter of
domestic law. 94 The court's analysis in this connection undermines
important policies furthered by the supremacy clause of the
Constitution.
95
In a penetrating critique of this aspect of Postal,96 Professor Rie-
senfeld has argued that a treaty is self-executing as a matter of domes-
tic law (i.e., the treaty provisions are applicable law in a United States
court without implementing statutes) if the treaty was intended, as a
matter of international law, to stipulate the immediate creation of
rights cognizable in domestic courts.97 For instance, a treaty might
provide certain types of emissaries with immunity from a specified
90. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294-95 (1933).
91. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432-33 (1964); Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 802-04 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358-61 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
92. See O'Reilly DeCamara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 52 (1908); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 803;
United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336, 342 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 90 (1970).
93. E.g., Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986). See generally Rogers, Domestic
Legal Challenges to U.S. Policy in Nicaragua, 6 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 77 (1987).
94. Postal, 589 F.2d at 876-84. In contrast, the liquor treaty in Ford and Cook was easily
found to be self-executing. Cook, 288 U.S. at 118-19.
95. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
96. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal.k Win at Any
Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892 (1980).
97. Id. at 896-97, 900-01; see also Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the
United States. A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627 (1986).
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class of civil suits.98 State A, with a domestic law system that admits
of no self-executing treaties, could accede to such a treaty, and com-
ply by passing legislation to establish the required immunity. The
United States also could accede to the same treaty, and article VI of
the Constitution would automatically make the immunity enforceable
in a United States court.99 Such automatic applicability is desirable in
a constitutional system such as ours where the treaty-making power
(President plus two-thirds of the Senate) is distinct from the lawmak-
ing power (majority of two Houses, subject to presidential veto).
On the other hand, a second treaty might require each con-
tracting state "to take such measures as may be necessary to establish
its jurisdiction" over certain criminal offenses." ° State B, with a
domestic legal system in which courts can define criminal jurisdiction
without legislative action, may not need further legislation to comply
with the treaty. In the United States, however, compliance with such
an international treaty obligation would require legislation, and to
this extent such a treaty would clearly not be self-executing as a mat-
ter of domestic law.101
Thus the question of whether a treaty is self-executing as a mat-
ter of United States law may depend on the nature of the international
obligation. This is not to say, however, that whether a treaty is self-
executing in the United States depends upon whether other states
intend it to be self-executing in their territories as well. State A
intends that the first treaty not be self-executing, but the treaty is
nonetheless clearly self-executing in the United States. State B
intends that the second treaty be self-executing, but that treaty is
nonetheless clearly not self-executing in the United States.
The Postal court, in contrast, assumed that because some states
98. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, art. 31 (1), 23
U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, (entered into force on Apr. 24, 1964, entered
into force for the United States on Dec. 13, 1972).
99. The self-executing nature of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra
note 98, is incontrovertible insofar as the United States is concerned, in view of subsequent
federal legislation extending its provisions to diplomats of nonparties to the convention,
without expressly implementing the convention with respect to diplomats of states parties. 22
U.S.C. § 254b (1982).
100. See, e.g., International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, art. 5, Dec. 17,
1979, -. U.S.T. .___, T.I.A.S. No. -, - U.N.T.S. -, reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
at 1458 (entered into force on June 3, 1983, entered into force for the United States on January
6, 1985).
101. Congress and the President clearly considered the provision for the establishment of
criminal jurisdiction in the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages as not
being self-executing. The President informed Congress that he would not submit the
instrument of ratification until legislation had been passed establishing the criminal
jurisdiction required by the convention. 20 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 590.
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that are parties to the Convention on the High Seas have domestic law
systems in which treaties are never self-executing, there cannot have
been a common intent that the treaty be self-executing. This analysis
ignores the relevant inquiry, which is whether the parties have obli-
gated themselves to provide judicially enforceable rights to individu-
als, and not whether the parties expect the particular obligation to
apply domestically in the territory of all parties without further legis-
lation. Moreover, the implication of the argument is that multilateral
treaties are rarely, if ever, self-executing. If the President, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, is unable to enter into treaties
providing immediately enforceable rights to individuals, without first
obtaining majority approval of both Houses of Congress, then the
clear policy of article VI of the Constitution, making valid treaties the
law of the land, would obviously be undercut.
Other aspects of the Postal court's non-self-executing analysis are
also troubling. For instance, the court relied upon a demonstration
that "a self-executing interpretation would severely curtail the tradi-
tional practice of the United States in exercising jurisdiction on the
high seas."' °2 The court had already determined that an international
law violation had occurred, and it was apparently of the opinion that
the treaty obligated the United States not to exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion over the crew.'13 In effect, the court was thus making the
remarkable suggestion that a treaty was not self-executing because the
United States became a party with no intention of complying with the
obligations of the treaty in the first place.
The Postal court also noted that "the [non-self-executing] inter-
pretation we approve today leaves to the injured state the option of
deciding whether it wishes to object."' 04 It is difficult to see how this
statement could not be applied to every allegedly self-executing treaty.
The danger of the Postal analysis lies not in the mere holding that
article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas is not self-executing.
Indeed, as demonstrated above, it is unlikely that article 6 was
intended in any case to preclude trial following illegal seizure. But if
it were, it should have been enforced. Otherwise the United States
will have difficulty entering into multilateral conventions that require
certain limitations to be immediately applicable in domestic courts.
It is ironic that such a difficulty could have an adverse impact on
our fight to control terrorism. This impact occurs, however, because
the primary international legal tool against terrorism is the multilat-
102. Postal, 589 F.2d at 878-81.
103. Id. at 878.
104. Id. at 884.
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eral treaty regarding a specific type of terrorist act, such as airplane
hijacking,"°5 airplane sabotage, °6 harming diplomats, 0 7 and taking
hostages. "' These treaties serve in part as multilateral extradition
treaties.0 9 The principle of specialty accordingly applies, and a ter-
rorist extradited to the United States for a crime defined in one of
these treaties should not, under Rauscher, be tried for another crime.
But if a United States court can distinguish Rauscher on the ground
that a multilateral treaty is involved, and reason that a non-self-exe-
cuting interpretation leaves to injured states the decision whether to
object, there is the logical possibility that the principle-of specialty
will not be applied by United States courts in some cases. Such hold-
ings would weaken efforts of the United States to obtain wide acces-
sion to these treaties, and to negotiate other treaties of this type.
IV. CONCLUSION
If an alleged terrorist is tried in the United States, he should be
able to argue against the jurisdiction of the court if there is no interna-
tionally recognized nexus between his action and the United States.
His mode of apprehension, however, is irrelevant unless he can show
that the United States, by trying him, is violating a treaty obligation
not to prosecute him. The fact that the apprehension alone may have
violated a treaty obligation is not enough. If, on the other hand, there
is a treaty obligation not to prosecute, such as the principle of spe-
cialty in typical extradition treaties, factors such as the multilateral
nature of the treaty should not prevent the obligation from being Self-
executing and thus from being applied by United States courts.
105. Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention),
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641. T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
106. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(Montreal Convention), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
107. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (New York Convention), Dec. 14, 1973, 28
U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
108. Convention against the Taking of Hostages. Dec. 17, 1979, __ U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No.
-, - U.N.T.S. -, reprinted in 18 INT'I. LEGAl MATERIAI S at 1456.
109. Art. 8, Hague Convention, supra note 105: art. 8, Montreal Convention, supra note
106; art. 8 New York Convention, supra note 107; art. 10, Convention against the Taking of
Hostages, supra note 108.
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